

Machinery has heard many witnesses, both from Government and private life, dwell on the harmful effects of turnover in top Government posts. The burden of their testimony is clear: that turnover—against the backdrop of the cold-war challenge—has acquired the dimensions of a national problem and must be dealt with as such, not merely discussed and dismissed as beyond reform.

The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Roger W. Jones, told the subcommittee that turnover had reached an "extremely dangerous" point.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. Herbert F. York, testified that "what you have to do is get people to come with fresh outside experience and hope that then they will stay long enough so that they can also build up personal knowledge and experience with regard to how to do things within the Government. Rapid turnover is one of the most serious problems, I think, we have. Again, this applies largely to the very top levels, the Presidential appointment levels. The average length of time a person holds his job—and this is not a new problem—is not really long enough to develop expertise at doing what needs to be done."

Marion B. Folsom, a director of the Eastman Kodak Co. and former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, noted that "it is difficult to get able people down here. By the time that they get well trained they leave. I know that it would be very difficult to run a business on that basis."

John J. Corson, a former Federal official, now a management consultant, who worked on recruiting Government executives, told the subcommittee that "experience over the past 7 years in recruiting for and retaining high talent in the governmental post, where national security policies are formulated and executed, demonstrates, with dangerous clarity, the difficulties our Government encounters."

And he cited as one major area of difficulty the fact that "these critically important governmental posts have been filled by a succession of able individuals who serve, on the average, 2 years or less. In short, the men responsible for aiding the President to formulate and carry out this Government's national security policies are a very transitory group—not all of them, but a substantial proportion."

Testimony before the subcommittee on this subject has stressed the growing intricacies of decisionmaking and program formulation in the national security field. The very complexities of our response to the cold war challenge—in all its economic, political, military, psychological, and scientific ramifications—have accentuated the impact of turnover. As Robert A. Lovett, the former Secretary of Defense, put it:

"It takes a long time for an able man without previous military service of some importance and experience in Government to catch up with his job in this increasingly complex Department (Defense). At a guess, I would say he could pay good dividends to the Government in about 2 years. Meanwhile, of course, he is becoming a more valuable asset each day. To lose him before, or just as he becomes productive is manifestly a serious waste of the effort that went into his training."

The present Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., told the subcommittee that "from the standpoint of the ability to do the work, I would agree with a 3- to 4-year requirement as being about correct. I think you can only start to make a contribution after the first year."

And in his address at the University of Notre Dame on June 5, President Eisenhower told his audience that "some frequency of withdrawal and return to private life would help eliminate the dangerous concept that

permanence in office is more important than the rightness of decision. Contrariwise, such a tour should not be so brief as to minimize the value of the contribution and diminish the quality of public service. Normally, a 4-year period in these policy posts would seem to be a minimum."

The factors behind the high rate of turnover as many and varied. Some of them can be identified and evaluated at the appointment stage. In particular, the turnover problem can be reduced by ending the practice of appointing men with the understanding from the outset that they will serve only a limited period.

Some of the factors contributing to turnover, particularly financial factors, may be approached legislatively. The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery expects to have recommendations on this subject ready for presentation to the next Congress.

In the meantime, the subcommittee believes a useful purpose can be served through a formal declaration by the Senate of its concern over the turnover in top governmental posts and its intention—through its committees—to explore with nominees their readiness and willingness to serve in office "so long as the President desires." Such recognition of the problem will, hopefully, not only be a first step toward its resolution, but also help lead to a more positive public attitude toward Government service.

Senate Resolution 338 is based on the premise that we need, and must have in Government the best scientists, the best lawyers, the best diplomats, the best planners, and the best administrators this country has to offer. Above all, we need the finest leadership—at the Cabinet and sub-cabinet levels throughout Government—which we can produce. On the decisions made and actions taken by this small group of men at the heart of the governmental process hangs the success of our national security policies.

These men must be experienced in the arts of government. They must be able to cope with the most complex, scientific, military, and political factors. They must be able to go to the core of a problem, reach decisions, and provide strong leadership. This requires the finest talent we can muster—talent that will stay long enough to make its weight felt. Unless we can dedicate leadership of this caliber to Government service, we cannot expect to succeed in the drawnout contest with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 338) was agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that individuals appointed to administrative and policymaking posts should be willing to serve for a period long enough to permit them to contribute effectively in their assigned tasks; and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that nominees appearing before its committees shall indicate their willingness to service so long as the President desires.

The preamble was amended, and was agreed to, as follows:

Whereas the requirements for policy planning and decisionmaking in the national security field have placed a premium on knowledgeable, experienced executives; and

Whereas the complexities and technicalities of national security problems have steadily increased the minimum period of Government experience required before responsibilities can be discharged effectively; and

Whereas brief tenure in office tends to have a harmful impact on the effective formulation and execution of national security policies while the Nation has been well

served through continuity of service in office by other officials; and

Whereas the problem of turnover has not been confined in its effects to any one administration: Now, therefore, be it

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, at some future date I probably shall have some comment to make on this resolution.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I would be delighted to join in the comment. But in the interest of expediting the business of the Senate today, I am sure that at this time there is no need to discuss in detail the resolution which has just now been agreed to.

I merely wish to say that the committee was unanimous. The resolution was cosponsored by all members of the subcommittee.

As a matter of fact, the resolution is in keeping with the comments made by the President in the course of the very fine address he made at Notre Dame, a short time ago, on the subject of tenure in the important area of national security.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Legislative Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

REPUBLICAN RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS DEMOCRATIC REACTION IN THE U-2 INCIDENT AND SUMMIT BLOWUP

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk about the U-2 incident and the collapse of the summit conference.

The senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BUSH] has written a report on this matter which deserves the attention of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. I commend it to them and ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPUBLICAN RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS DEMOCRATIC REACTION IN THE U-2 INCIDENT AND SUMMIT BLOWUP

(By U.S. Senator PRESCOTT BUSH, of Connecticut)

We have long been aware of the North-South conflict within the Democratic Party, and the rifts which exist between the radical wing and the moderates and conservatives.

But a more serious division has recently arisen on an issue which never should have been injected into partisan domestic politics. I refer, of course, to the discordant voices in the Democratic Party since the U-2 espionage plane incident and the collapse of the summit conference.

Who speaks for the Democratic Party on foreign policy, and the related issues which involve the security of the United States, and the safety of every American family?

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Is it Adlai Stevenson, who claims President Eisenhower gave Khrushchev a "sledge hammer and a crowbar" to wreck the summit conference?

Or is it Jim Farley, who says Stevenson attempts to use the U-2 incident "to 'sledge hammer and crowbar' another disastrous nomination for himself as the apostle of appeasement out of the Democratic Party"?

Is it JACK KENNEDY, who said the President should "apologize" or "express regret" to Khrushchev for the flight of the U-2 over Soviet territory?

Or is it LYNDON JOHNSON, who shouted to the Washington State convention at Spokane: "I am not prepared to apologize to Mr. Khrushchev. I am not prepared to send regrets to Mr. Khrushchev"?

I have said this issue should never have been injected into partisan domestic politics. But since the Democrats have done it, I say to you that we are fortunate as we proceed to nominate our candidate for President.

We can leave it to the Democrats to accuse each other of being, in Mr. Farley's words, "apostles of appeasement." We can let the Democrats imply, as Senator JOHNSON did, that if a certain Democrat were elected President he might feel compelled to apologize or express regret to Khrushchev.

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S DEMONSTRATED ABILITY

We have a candidate for our presidential nomination who has demonstrated—in Moscow—his ability to stand up to Khrushchev, and refuse to knuckle under in response to truculent threats.

We have a candidate who has demonstrated—in Latin America—his physical courage under assault by Communist-led mobs.

We have a candidate who, by his long service on the National Security Council, knows what must be done to preserve the freedom of the United States and of the free world.

We have a candidate, tested and trained for the job, supremely qualified to assume the grave responsibilities of the President of the United States.

We have a candidate who will be a worthy successor to our great President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man who knows the Eisenhower policies and is ready to build upon that firm foundation to a greater America—

RICHARD M. NIXON.

WHAT THE U-2 ACCOMPLISHED

I should like now to discuss the U-2 incident and the torpedoing of the summit conference by Mr. Khrushchev in terms of what these events mean to us as Americans.

The flights of the U-2 planes over Soviet territory which have taken place over the past 4 years have given the U.S. information of incalculable value.

We have learned the location of the Russian missile bases, planes, submarines and centers of arms production, including atomic plants. Photographs taken at the extraordinary height of 70,000 feet have revealed these vital target areas with striking clarity.

The penetration of the borders of the Soviet Union by our planes has disproved Khrushchev's boasts about the invulnerability of his air defenses. It now appears conclusive that the Soviet's antiaircraft missiles have been unable to reach our planes flying at heights of 70,000 feet, and that Pilot Powers' plane was downed only after a "flame-out" forced him to descend to lower levels.

This knowledge was essential to the defense of the United States and of the entire free world. Committed as we are not to strike the first blow against any nation, our security has depended upon our ability to retaliate against any attack upon us or our allies with instant, terrible destruction. To retaliate effectively, we must know where the vital targets are, and we must know that SAC, our major retaliatory force, can get through to them.

The U-2 flights gave the men with responsibility for our defenses—President Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the civilian Secretaries of our armed services and others within a limited circle—the knowledge they had to have to plan a safe level of our own military power. This information was not available, for obvious security reasons, to Senator SYMINGTON and other critics who have been demanding billions of dollars more in spending for defense.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS MUST CONTINUE

President Eisenhower has suspended U-2 flights over the Soviet Union for the balance of his term. We shall have to depend on other methods, including photo reconnaissance satellites which soon will be in the skies, for gathering this information which the United States must have for her protection, and the protection of the free world.

Our intelligence operations must continue, by whatever means are available, until the Soviet Union accepts President Eisenhower's offer to have the United Nations conduct "open skies" surveillance over the entire world.

The collapse of the summit conference was a blow to the hopes of the British and others among our allies, who believed that face-to-face meetings by the heads of states could bring meaningful progress toward peaceful coexistence.

But it also resulted in a strengthening of the unity between the United States and her allies. Mr. Khrushchev's vitriolic denunciations of President Eisenhower have sent a wave of revulsion around the world, and have drawn the nations of the West closer together. There is going on, among our allies, a realistic reappraisal.

Here at home, the breakdown of the summit conference also calls for reappraisal of our position in the world, and of our responsibilities. On assignment by the Senate Committee on Armed Services, I have visited our military outposts, not only in Western Europe, but also in the Far East. I have been with the Sixth Fleet, in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Formosa and the Philippine Sea. I believe I have some understanding of the dangers we face and of the extent of our commitments throughout this troubled planet.

COMMUNISTS MAKE "COEXISTENCE" SEEM UNREALISTIC

To me, talk of "peaceful coexistence" has seemed unrealistic in view of Communist China's bitter enmity of the United States. It might have been possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on control of atomic weapons, for it is as much in her interest as ours to keep this terrible destructive power out of the hands of the Chinese Reds. But it is hard to see how we could reach significant overall disarmament agreements with Russia when we are committed to resist aggression by Communist China in the Far East.

In this unstable area, the Chinese Communists are constantly probing for weak spots. Had it not been for the Seventh Fleet, a constant reminder of the power of the United States, I believe many small nations in the East would already have been crushed by the Reds.

Now that world tensions have been heightened by the breakdown at the summit, America must face the unpleasant fact that we may well become involved in at least small wars, and possible fairly large ones in the Far East.

The summit collapse may prove to be a blessing in disguise if it awakens the American people to reality.

WE MUST ACCEPT RISK; PAY PRICE

If we are to maintain our exposed positions all over the world we must recognize the risks and be willing to pay the price.

Now that our Western Allies have been restored, with our help, to positions of economic strength, we must call upon them to do more in the common defense.

But even should our allies share more of the costs, we must still pay a large price for our security.

That price means greater expenditures for defense, for scientific and space research and for education, including scientific and vocational training.

It means giving up some of our luxuries, and the "business as usual" philosophy.

It means an unceasing search for ways to achieve economies in our National Government; a ruthless war on waste and extravagance wherever found; and a system of priorities in Government spending which "puts first things first." Failure to face up to these necessities could mean higher Federal taxes.

As Americans and as Republicans, as the party of responsibility, we have a solemn obligation to place these facts before the people.

The times are too serious for a campaign in which unpleasant facts are obscured, the sky is the limit on promises, and the question of who is to pay if promises are fulfilled is conveniently ignored. Both parties have conducted this kind of a campaign in the past, although I believe our opponents have sinned in this respect far more than have we.

And I believe the American people will respond to a campaign of truth and honesty. In times of stress in this great Nation, the people have always risen to the occasion. So shall it be in this troubled year of 1960.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business for the consideration of new reports.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business, under the heading "New Reports."

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Edward C. Sweeney to be a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board for the remainder of the term expiring August 9, 1960.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Edward C. Sweeney to be a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board for a term of 5 years expiring August 9, 1965.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.